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Naval Postgraduate School
Background: Perceived mismanagement of 
defense acquisition programs
• Need for improvements in workforce professionalism:
– Hoover Commissions I (1949) and II (1955)
– Fitzhugh Commission (1970)  
– Commission on Government Procurement (1972)
– Packard Commission (1986) 
• Failures of past reforms that were focused on policy process and procedure        , ,   
caused policy makers to focus on people (acquisition workforce).
– “DoD acquisition problems can be solved only if those charged with 
responsibility for day-to-day implementation of weapons systems programs 
are adequately trained, experienced, and motivated.” (CRS, 1985)
– “Acquisition personnel are unique in government in that an investment 
aimed at improving quality offers payoffs of truly immense proportions” 
(Mavroules 1991), 
• Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) enacted in 1990
Proposition: A professional workforce contributes to improved 
acquisition outcomes .
Focus on Major Program Managers
Program Manager (PM) professionalism:
– Training, education, experience
• Defense Procurement Improvement Act (1985)     
required  Secretaries to establish requirements for 
PMs (may be waived) 
Less frequent rotations (longer tenure in office)–       
• Hoover II (1955) opined two-year average was too 
short
F i i (C l i 1981) f li d i• our-year m n mum ar ucc  –  orma ze  n 
PL 98-525 (1985)
– Dedicated career paths – incentives, motivation
Milit i ili ti l i– ary vs. c v an – opera ona  exper ence vs. 
continuity
Proposition: Professional PMs contribute to improved 
acquisition outcomes.
DBB PM Task Group
21 April Draft Report
USD(AT&L) Charter:
• Bring best business practices from the private sector to improve the 
intake and development of military PMs     
• Focus on the selection, training and development, management and 
performance measurement, and incentives/rewards for uniformed PMs
• Provide recommendations for improving the effectiveness of military        
PMs based on private sector best practices for major PM executives
Methodology – SME interviews
Pertinent observations:
• Military PMs tours shortened by promotion, deployments, transfers –
leads to short-term decisions and risk avoidance, to the long-term 
detriments of the program
• Civilian PMs: more continuity and more business acumen (?)
Recommendation - Professionalize military acquisition corps OR put 
civilians in leadership PM roles with military in operational/field roles
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GAO Report (Oct 2010) on the Acquisition 
Workforce
• GAO finding: “To provide appropriate oversight of the 
proficiency and capability of its acquisition workforce      , 
DOD will need metrics to measure skills, knowledge, 
and abilities, and how certification training contributes to 
i ti l f lt ”organ za ona  per ormance resu s.  
• DoD response: “Workforce capability is a function of 
having the right number of people [size] in the right 
functional areas [composition] with the right education, 
training and experience ”,  .
“ROI” (Evaluation) Literature on Employee 
Development Programs
• Private sector:
– Justifications for HR training budgets
– Contributions to profitability  
– Employee development for retention purposes
– Many barriers (e.g., isolating program effects); no silver bullet 
• Public sector: Literature is sparse; few agencies systematically 
l t th i HR f ti d it i ti l i teva ua e e r  unc on an  s organ za ona  mpac





• Five levels for evaluation: (increasing complexity/cost?)
– I Reaction – measure employee satisfaction with the program.       
– II. Learning – measure changes in employee knowledge, skills, attitudes
– III. Applications – measure changes in on-the-job behaviors
– IV. Business results – measure changes in business-impact variables
– V ROI – compare benefits relative to costs.      
Research Hypotheses
Acquisition outcomes are better:
• In programs without waivers for PM education      , 
training, experience
• In programs with greater PM stability (longer tours)
• In programs with civilian PMs
• In Air Force programs than in Army programs, and in 
Army programs than in Navy programs.
– Average acquisition experience of major PMs (1990 House 
Report):
• USAF – 97% with at least 8 years (average is 17 years)
• USA – 81% with at least 8 years
• USN – 71% with at least 8 years
Data
Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Retrieval (DAMIR) system – programmatic data, 
metrics
– CPI, SPI
Annual percentage unit cost (program (PAUC)–      , 
procurement (APUC)) change from baseline
AT&L Data Mart – workforce data
Annual percentage unit cost (PAUC, APUC) 
change from baseline
AIM -9X 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 SLOPE
% CHANGE CURRENT BL PAUC 5.31 2.04 -6.12 -2.45 1.22 1.63 -1.22 2.38 3.57 4.37 11.9 2.84 .505










1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010
 = .
APUC SLOPE = .587
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Program Factors
Component: Army, Navy, or Air Force
Waiver for PM requirements: yes or no
Civilian PM: yes or no    
PM assignment duration: short (< 24 months) or 
long (> 36 months)   
Any differences in program outcomes?
